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ONLINE LIBERTY: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
IN THE INFORMATION AGE
ROBERT

DAWKINst

ABSTRACT

Cyberspace is generally conceived as a highly participato1y environment that facilitates broad-based participation in the free marketplace of
ideas. This paper considers the impact of the new media context upon
the constitutional validity of laws regulating expressive content. Canadian jurisprudence regarding freedom of expression rights pursuant to
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms are reviewed and contrasted with the American medium specific approach. It is argued that
current Canadian jurisprudence indicates that the new media context
should not alter the level of scrutiny in the Section 1 analysis. While the
democratizing influence of cyberspace is laudable, new media must be
considered in the context of Canadian society and Charter values. The
constitutional validity of laws regulating the content of online expression must not be determined by technology at the expense of general
social and constitutional principles.

INTRODUCTION

Cyberspace is generally conceived of as a highly participatory environment that facilitates broad-based participation in the free marketplace of ideas. The accessibility of the Internet has significantly increased the ability of individual persons to access information and to
express their opinions to the connnunity at large. As a result, the content
of cyberspace has been said to be "as diverse as human thought." 1
t Robert Dawkins graduated with a B.A. (Honours) from the University of Toronto and
Dalhousie Law School with an LLB. He would like to thank Professor Teresa Scassa and
Professor Wayne Mackay for their suggestions and constrnctive criticism in writing this paper.
He would also like to thank Patricia Elliot, Tina Piper, Sandi Smith, Fred Dawkins and Dana
for their editorial comments.
1
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), online: WL (DCT).
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Although increased access to media is generally perceived as positive, broad-based participation does not come without a price.
Cyberspace · facilitates the expression of ideas without discrimination.
While it facilitates the dissemination of educational and political speech,
it also assists in the distribution of potentially hannful content such as
hate propaganda and pornography. The Internet does not effectively
identify or distinguish sources and users allowing virtually anyone to
access any type of material. Such freedom of access is troubling to many
as it allows minors easy access to material restricted in real space. As a
result, there has been increasing pressure on governments to regulate the
content of cyberspace.
Canadian lawmakers have, thus far, taken a hands-off approach to
cyberspace content regulation. 2 Instead of directly engaging online
expression, they have chosen to rely upon existing laws that restrict
offensive expression and set community standards of decency. As many
of these laws are drafted in medium neutral language, it has been argued
that they may be applied to the Internet with equal force. 3 The problem
with this position is that it has been adopted without adequate consideration of how this new context will affect the constitutional scrutiny of
Charter violations previously upheld by Canadian Courts. The high
level of interactivity, user control and broad participation online may
arguably alter the balance of interests between individual rights to
"freedom of' expression and the rights of others to "freedom from" the
effects of haimful expression.
In this paper, the impact of new media upon the constitutional
validity of laws regulating the content of expression is considered.
Canadian principles of freedom of expression rights pursuant to the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 4 will be reviewed and contrasted with the American medium specific approach. It will be argued

2

At the time of writing there were no Canadian Jaws aimed directly at the regulation of
online content.
3 See generally, Canada, The Cyberspace is not a "no law land": a study of the issues of
liability for content circulating on the Internet, (Ottawa: Industry Canada, 1997), (by M.
Racicot et al).
4
s. 2(b ), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982
(U.K. ), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter the Charter]. Section 2 (b) guarantees to "eve1yone" "freedom
of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of
communication".

104 - DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

that Canadian jurisprudence indicates that the new media context should
not alter the level of scrutiny in the Section 1 analysis. 5 While the
democratizing influence of cyberspace is laudable, new media must be
considered in the context of Canadian society and Charter values generally. Although a consideration of the nature and operation of the medium
of expression is an essential part of a full contextual analysis, it must be
remembered that cyberspace does not exist separately from the society
of users that operate it. Accordingly, the constitutional validity of laws
regulating the content of online expression must be determined according to general social and constitutional principles rather than a narrow
focus on the technological nature of the medium of expression.
Part I of this paper will review the meaning of freedom of expression
as defined in Canadian jurisprudence to set the framework for how
cyberspace will be approached by Canadian courts. Consideration will
be given to key principles including: the principle of content neutrality;
the rationale for protecting freedom of expression; the general principles
relied upon by Canadian courts in the Section 1 analysis of Section 2(b)
violations; and, the impact that the medium of expression has had upon
such Section 1 jurisprudence in the past. It will be argued that these
factors indicate that the medium of expression should not determine the
constitutional validity of a law. Rather, the medium is only one consideration in a full contextual analysis.
In Part II, some of the special challenges raised by new media are
considered. Firstly, the democratizing impact of the Internet is evaluated. Specifically, the implications oflow barriers to access, user control
and anonymity are considered. The impact of pragmatic limitations on
enforceability, such as territorial jurisdiction and the technological nature of cyberspace are also reviewed. Finally, this section discusses the
problems inherent in attempting to apply existing laws to the context of
the new media.
Part III considers the American approach to First Amendment 6
violations in cyberspace. The basic principles of First Amendment

5

Ibid. s. l. Section l states that: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."
6
The First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States asserts that "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."
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jurisprudence and the medium-specific approach adopted by American
Courts are reviewed. Particular consideration will be given to the United
States Supreme Court decision in ACLU v. Reno 7 , which adopted a strict
scrutiny standard in regard to First Amendment violations in
cyberspace.
In Part IV it will be argued that Canadian Courts should not adopt
the American medium-specific approach in regard to Internet expression. The medium-specific approach is flawed as it resolves the level of
judicial deference based upon broad characterizations of the medium
rather than through a thorough examination of constitutional principles.
The medium-specific approach is inconsistent with the contextual and
principled approach generally adopted by Canadian Courts in Section 1
jurisprudence. Cyberspace has not transfonned the fundamental principles of Canadian democracy and, as a result, it does not warrant special
constitutional scrutiny in all cases.

I. THE MEANING OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN CANADA
Before considering the special challenges created by new media, it is
important to outline the general principles behind right to freedom of
expression in Canada. In this part, I argue that Canadian courts have,
thus far, rejected medium-specific standards of scrutiny in regard to
Section 2(b) violations. In support of this position I will first consider
the principle of content neutrality and the rationales adopted by the court
in support of this principle. I argue that there is a strong connection
between the concept of content neutrality and a medium neutral standard. Second, this part discusses the general approach to the Section 1
analysis of purposeful content regulation. The principles traditionally
used to justify judicial deference to Parliament will be reviewed.
Thirdly, this section considers the role of the medium in the Section 1
jurisprudence prior to the emergence of the Internet. I will demonstrate
that while the medium of communication is a critical element of the
factual context, it is not, and should not, be the determinative factor in
setting the level of scrutiny to be applied to the Section 1 analysis.

7

521 U.S. 844; 117 S.Ct. 2329, online: WL (SCT).
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1. Content Neutrality, Medium-Neutrality and the Freedom of
Expression Rationales
Long before it was constitutionally enshrined, the right to freedom
of expression was legally recognized in Canada. 8 Since the adoption of
the Charter, freedom of expression has received full constitutional
protection9 except where such limitations are prescribed by law and may
be "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."10 The
Supreme Court's interpretation of freedom of expression rights in Section 2(b) of the Charter has cast a very broad net in defining protected
expression. Freedom of expression is essential to the proper functioning
of a democratic society and any attempt by government to outlaw or
restrict particular viewpoints requires justification under Section 1. 11
lnvin Toy v. Quebec 12 developed the analytical framework for freedom of expression cases 13 and adopted the principle of content neutrality. Pursuant to this approach, constitutional protection is extended to

8

See for example, Re Alberta Statutes, [1938] S.C.R. 100; Samur v. City of Quebec,
[ 1957] S.C.R. 285; Swit:::man v. Ebling, [ 1953] 2 S.C.R. 299. In these cases the Supreme Court
recognized the essential nature of unfettered public discourse and criticism of government
policy in Canadian democracy. TI1ese decisions suggest that despite the principle of parliamentaiy supremacy, no level of government could restrict political discourse. This implied bill
of rights clearly demonstrates a longstanding commitment to freedom of expression by
Canadian courts. For further discussion of the implied bill of rights approach see P.W. Hogg,
Constitutional Law of Canada, 1999 Student Edition (Toronto: Carswell, 1999) at 628 to 631.
9 Section 2 (b) of the Charter, supra note 4, guarantees to "everyone" "freedom of thought,
belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication".
10
Section 1 allows for limitations on individual rights where government can demonstrate
that such a limitation is in the public interest. See above, supra note 5.
11 While time, place and manner restrictions have been approached in a more deferential
manner than purposeful restrictions, they may be found to amount to an unreasonable
restriction on freedom of expression where the law affects more than the physical consequences of patiicular conduct. See for example Ramsden v. Peterborough, [1993] 2 S.C.R.
1084. I intend to focus on purposeful content restrictions for the purposes of this paper. For a
discussion of time, place and manner restrictions on expression see Hogg, supra note 8, at 860
to 861.
12 [1989] S.C.R. 927 [hereinafter Irwin Toy].
13 Ibid. If an impugned law constitutes a purposeful restriction on the content of expression
or of fonn tied to content, the Court proceeds directly to the Section 1 analysis and requires the
government actor to meet the burden of justification. If the content regulation is merely an
incidental effect of apparently content-neutral regulation, then there is a further burden on the
challenging party to demonstrate that the particular expression in question is consistent with
the rationale of freedom of expression guarantees.
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any activity that attempts to convey meaning. 14 While it may be argued
that expression inconsistent with rationales underlying freedom of expression should be excluded from constitutional protection, the majority
of the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected this approach to defining
Charter rights. 15 The preferred approach is to define essential rights
broadly and require justification of their infringement. Similarly, the
Court has refused to limit the scope of section 2(b) by excluding content
that conflicts with other Charter rights and values. 16 Thus, among other
things, the Charter initially provides equal protection to political
speech, commercial speech, 17 hate speech, 18 obscenity, 19 the expression
of deliberate falsehoods, 20 and sexual solicitation. 21 The broad inclusive
approach embodied in the principle of content neutrality and the fact that
Section 2(b) protects "freedom of the press and other media of communication", indicate that the medium of expression is irrelevant in defining the scope of constitutionally protected speech. Virtually all content
is protected no matter where it is expressed. 22
In Irwin Toy the Supreme Court clearly states the rationales for
protecting freedom of expression in Canada. These may be summarized
as follows:
(I) seeking and attaining the truth is an inherently good activity;
(2) participation in social and political decision-making is to be fostered and encouraged; and (3) the diversity in fonns of individual
self-fulfillment and human flourishing ought to be cultivated in an
essentially tolerant, indeed welcoming, environment not only for

14

Irwin Toy, supra note 12 at 968.
R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R 697 [hereinafter Keegstra].
16 Ibid. In Keegstra, the majority of the Court, per Dickson C.J, refused to exclude hate
speech from constitutional protection due to its conflict with the right to equality in Section 15
and the recognition of multiculturalism in s. 27. Instead, these factors became relevant during
the Section I analysis as discussed below.
17
See e.g. Toy, supra note 12; Ford v. Quebec, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712; RJR-MacDonald v.
Canada, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199.
18
Keegstra, supra note 15; R. v. Andreivs, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 870, Canada (Human Rights
Commission) v. Taylor, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892 [hereinafter Taylor].
19 R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 [hereinafter Butler].
20
R. v. Zundel, [ 1992] 2 S.C.R. 731.
21
Ress. 193 and 195 of Criminal Code (Prostitution Reference), [1990] S.C.R. 1123.
22
Only expression in a violent fonn is excluded from constitutional protection. See e.g.
Keegstra, supra note 15.
15
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the sake of those who convey a meaning, but also for the sake of
those to whom it is conveyed. 23

The truth-seeking rationale adopts Oliver Wendell Holmes' concept of
the free marketplace of ideas, which asserts that:
[t]he best test oftrnth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market ... Every year if not every day we have
to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect
knowledge. While that experiment is pai1 of our system I think that we
should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of
opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless
they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful
and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required
to save the count1y. 24

The crux of this free market model is that only through unrestricted and
open debate can we ensure the development of knowledge. Accordingly,
free and unfettered expression should be aggressively defended in order
to facilitate human and social development.
The main thrust of the democratic participation rationale is aptly
captured by Alan Borovoy in his article, New Threats to Political
Rights, when he states:
[o]f all the rights we enjoy in our democratic society, freedom of
expression may be the most crucial. Although admittedly not an
absolute, this freedom is the lifeblood of the democratic system. It
enables us to influence the conditions under which we live. It provides
us with a vehicle by which we can recrnit and mobilize public support
for the redress of our various grievances ... freedom of expression is a
strategic freedom - a freedom on which our other freedoms depend. A
wise old trade unionist once called it the "grievance procedure" of the
democratic system. 25

This rationale recognizes the essential nature of freedom of expression
to the proper functioning of parliamentary democracy. In order to have
responsible democratic government we must ensure people are free to
openly criticize government policy, to vote in a particular manner, and
to support a particular ideology, without fear of government sanction.

23

Supra note 12 at 976.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 at 630 to 631 (1919) (Dissenting).
25
(1999) 10 N.J.C.L. 453.
24
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The self-fulfillment rationale is perhaps the broadest of the three. It
recognizes an intrinsic value in allowing people the freedom to pursue
their own interests and develop their sense of self. While constitutional
protection is limited to "expressive.activity", this rationale affords protection to a broad range of activities such as "art, music and dance."26
Current jurisprudence clearly suggests that expression in new media
would receive full constitutional protection pursuant to the content and
medium neutral approach, so long as it attempts to convey meaning and
is not found to be in a violent form. 27 This being said, not all content
contributes equally to the rationales underlying freedom of expression
and it is constitutionally permissible to restrict the content of expression
if such a limitation may be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society pursuant to Section 1 of the Charter.

2. The Balancing of Interests: Justifying Charter Violations
Under Section 1
Once a challenging party has demonstrated that government action
has resulted in a limitation of freedom of expression rights the onus is on
the government to demonstrate that such a limitation may be justified
"in a free and democratic society" pursuant to Section 1 of the Charter.
The Section 1 analysis requires a highly contextual balancing of public
and individual interests. Thus the medium of expression may be relevant
at this stage of analysis.
For a limitation on expression to be "prescribed by law" it must not
be vague: it must provide an "intelligible standard". 28 Furthermore, the
limitation must be generally consistent with democratic principles. In R.
v. Oakes29 Dickson C.J. suggested that democratic principles would
include factors such as:
P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, supra note 8 at 852.
As jurisprudence in regard to cyberspace develops it is possible that new forms of cyberviolence will be conceived of that could be excluded from Section 2(b). For example, is it
possible for a cyber-rape to occur in an online chat room? A full analysis of this issue is
beyond the scope of this paper but the Supreme Court has, thus far, been unwilling to exclude
expression from section 2(b) protection that may argued to be akin to violence (see Keegstra,
supra note 15). This suggests that violence or hmm caused solely by expressive means will not
be excluded from the scope of section 2(b). Accordingly, I believe that all cyber-expression
will receive constitutional protection at the first stage of analysis.
28
Irwin Toy, supra note 12 at 983.
29
[1986] I S.C.R. 103 [hereinafter Oakes].
26
27
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respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, commitment to
social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and
political institutions which enhance the participation of individuals
and groups in society. 30

It is apparent that these factors may conflict with one another. For

example, in the context of hate speech there may be conflict between
"accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs" and "respect for cultural
and group identity," "the respect for inherent dignity of the human
person" and "commitment to social justice". Accordingly, these factors
must be balanced in the context of the challenged government action,
paying careful consideration to competing interests and constitutional
values.
In order to ensure a balancing of interests, the government is obligated to meet the requirements of the Oakes Test31 • First, this test
requires the government to demonstrate that it has a pressing and substantial objective that justifies limitation of a constitutionally guaranteed
right. Second, the action must be proportional to the objective. To meet
this second element of the test a limitation must be rationally connected
to the objective, must impair the right only so much as is necessaiy to
achieve a valid objective, and the benefits of the limitation must outweigh the dainage caused by restricting individual freedom.
Although the Oakes Test establishes a rigid framework for the
Section 1 analysis, the Supreme Court of Canada has adopted a deferential approach to governmental infringement in some circumstances.
Where the govermnent has made a reasonable effort to strike a balance
between competing interest groups, for example, where there is conflicting scientific or social science evidence, in the allocation of scarce
resources, or where limitations aim to protect vulnerable groups, the
courts will often defer to parliamentary expertise. 32 In the context of
freedom of expression cases, the court will also consider the relationship
between the restricted content and the freedom of expression rationales.
Where the content of the expression contributes little to the pursuit of
trnth, democratic participation, or self-fulfillment, it will be easier to

Ibid at 136.
Oakes, supra note 29 at 138 to 139.
32
Irwin Toy, supra note 12 at 993.
30

31
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justify an infringement of freedom of expression rights. 33 This is also
the case where the content of expression is in tension with international
obligations or other Charter rights. 34 While the focus of the Charter is
on the protection of individual rights, Section 1 jurisprudence demonstrates that where the interests of society as a whole outweigh the
interests of the individual, Charter rights may be permanently restricted.
In his address at the Symposium on Free Speech and Privacy in the
Information Age, fonner Supreme Court Justice John Sopinka suggested
that in regulating the Internet the context of the medium must be taken
into account. 35 Despite this fact, he also asserted that freedom of expression is no more absolute in cyberspace than it is in real space. This raises
a significant question: if cyberspace is relevant to the constitutional
analysis of freedom or expression rights, how should it be taken into
account?
3. Justifying Limitations and the Medium of Expression
While Canada has not adopted medium specific standards of scrutiny, the Supreme Court's decisions in Ramsden v. Peterborough
(City) 36 and Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor3 7 clearly
demonstrate that the medium of co1mnunication may be relevant in
assessing the constitutional enforceability of laws which infringe freedom of expression rights. In this part, I argue that these cases demonstrate that the medium of expression is only significant as part of the
factual context of the case. It should not be viewed in isolation as
detenninative of the level of scrutiny to be applied to government action.
In Ramsden, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a
municipal by-law, which banned all postering on public property. The

Keegstra, supra note 15; Taylor, supra note 18. In these cases, the majority of the
Supreme Court held that the fact that hate speech contributes little to the freedom of expression rationales made it easier to justify limitations on that fonn of expression. In Butler, supra
note 19 obscenity, was given similar treatment.
34 See e.g. Keegstra, supra note 15.
35
J. Sopinka S.C.J., " Freedom of Speech and Privacy in the Infonnation Age" (Symposhun on Free Speech and Privacy in the Infonnation Age, University of Waterloo, 26
November, 1994, online: Electronic Frontier Canada <gopher://insight.mcmaster.ca/00/org/
efc/doc/sfsp/sopinka.txt> (date accessed: IO February 2000).
36 [1993] 2 S.C.R. 1084; (1993), 106 D.L.R. (4'") 233 [hereinafter Ramsden].
37
Supra note 18.
33
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accused was engaging in commercial expression, placing advertisements for musical performances on public hydro poles and when
charged, challenged the by-law under Section 2(b) of the Charter. The
City of Peterborough argued that the purpose of the law was to limit the
physical consequences of postering, "litter, aesthetic blight and associated hazards", and was not a violation of the Charter as it limited the
location rather than the content of expression. The court rejected this
argument as the ban was absolute and had the effect of limiting the
expression of important political, cultural and artistic messages. In
striking down the law, the Court asserted that although there was a
pressing and substantial concern to limit the physical consequences of
postering, an absolute ban did not meet the minimal impainnent requirement of the Oakes Test, as there were reasonable alternatives. Furthermore, an absolute ban in this case was a disproportionate measure
outweighed by the individual interest in freedom of expression.
A central factor in Ramsden is that postering has historically been
the primary means of promoting views that are unable to gain access to
the popular media. Speaking for the court, Iacobucci J. adopted the
position that:
[p ]osters are an economic way of spreading a message. Utility poles
have become the prefeITed postering place since the inception of the
telephone system .... Posters have always been a medium of communication of revolutionaiy and unpopular ideas. They have been called
"the circulating libraries of the poor". They have been not only a
political weapon but also a means of communicating at1istic, cultural
and commercial messages. Their modem day use for effectively and
economically conveying a message testifies to their venerability
through the ages. 38 [emphasis in original]

The Court's conclusions demonstrate that the medium of communication may be significant to the constitutionality of a law where its very
nature ties it strongly to the freedom of expression rationales. In
Ramsden, the desire to control litter was not an important enough
objective to justify a complete ban on expression in a cheap and highly
accessible forum.
The medium of expression was also considered in Taylor, which
involved a freedom of expression challenge to Section 13 (1) of the
38

Ramsden, supra note 36 at 1102
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Canadian Human Rights Act.39 Section 13(1) restricts particular expressive content, hate-speech, in a particular medium - "telephonic communications". The law mandates that using the telephone to promote hatred
against vulnerable groups violates human rights. As the law refers
specifically to the telephonic medium, the nature and use of the telephone was significant in the Section 1 analysis.
Writing for the majority, Dickson CJ. (as he then was) considered
the relationship between promoting hatred and the "telephonic" medium. One of the arguments presented in Taylor was that the limitation
could not be justified because it restricted private, "one-to-one" communications. Chief Justice Dickson rejected this position, taking note of the
fact that Section 13 (1) only addresses repeated telephonic communications. He held that although generally telephonic communications that
occur on a one-to-one basis would be private, "the overall effect of
phone campaigns is undeniably public, and the reasonable assumption
to make is that these campaigns can have an effect upon the public's
beliefs and attitudes.''4° Chief Justice Dickson's majority decision exemplifies a full contextual approach, indicating that determinations
regarding the public/private divide must be considered in the context of
the case as a whole and not merely by reference to the technological
nature of the medium. This interpretation illustrates the preference in
Canadian jurisprudence for contextual analysis that looks behind the
technology and individual communications to the overall purpose of the
communicator.
Dickson also considered the accessibility of the medium and its
ability to enhance the credibility of the speaker in the specific context of
hate propaganda. He agreed with the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal
that the use of the telephonic medium gives "the listener the impression
of direct, personal, almost private, contact by the speaker, provides no

39

40

R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6. Section 13 (1) states that:
It is a discriminatory practice for a person or a group of persons acting in
concert to communicate telephonically or to cause to be so communicated,
repeatedly, in whole or in part by means of the facilities of a telecommm1ication undertaking within the legislative authority of Parliament, any
matter that is likely to expose a person or persons to hatred or contempt by
reason of the fact that that person or those persons are identifiable on the
basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination.
Taylor, supra note 18 at 937.
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realistic means of questioning the information or views presented, and is
subject to no counter-argument within that particular communications
context."41 Thus, despite the fact that the telephone generally facilitates
highly interactive communications, in the context of telephone hate
campaigns, this aspect of the medium is diminished. The telephone, like
postering, provides a cheap and accessible method of promoting diverse
viewpoints but this factor must be viewed in the context of the particular
law challenged. While low barriers to access would clearly make it
difficult to justify broad over-inclusive limitations like that in Ramsden,
for some types of content it may strengthen the arguments for restriction.
In circumstances where the medium facilitates the effective promotion
of viewpoints and enhances the credibility of the speaker, the arguments
for limitation may be strengthened by increased potential for hai111.
In upholding Section 13 (1), Dickson considered the medium of
expression in the context of the case as a whole. Chief Justice Dickson
was highly influenced by the fact that hate speech contributes little to the
truth seeking, democratic participation or the self-fulfillment rationales
of freedom of expression rights. He was also influenced by the fact that
the promotion of hatred was in direct tension with the principle of
equality in Section 15 of the Charter and the commitment to fostering
multiculturalism in Section 27. While he considered the medium to be
relevant to his analysis under the Oakes Test, he did not make broad
generalizations about the telephonic medium. Rather, he specifically
considered the connection between the government objective and the
medium of communication as part of a complete factual context. He held
that ease of access, lack of interactivity, and the exclusion of broad
public scmtiny assisted in the promotion of hatred. Accordingly he
found that limitations of this sort of expression could be justified in a
democratic society that places high value on equality and
multiculturalism.
In her dissenting opinion, McLachlin J. (as she then was), asserted
that Section 13 is overly broad and therefore fails the proportionality
aspect of the Oakes Test. Justice McLachlin expressed concern that
Section 13(1) catches a significant amount of expression that is not
intended to promote hate groups, speech that is constitutionally pro-

41

Taylor, supra note 18 at 93 7.
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tected and irrelevant to the legislative purpose of Section 13 (1 ). She
asserted that such overbreadth might have a "chilling effect" on important forms of expression and result in self-censorship, thereby increasing
the impact of this limitation on a fundamental right. Like the analysis in
Ramsden, she considered the natme of the telephonic medium broadly:
The telephone is perhaps the least expensive mode by which less
advantaged groups or individuals can communicate their ideas and
beliefs. Native groups, religious minorities and others who identify
themselves by their colour, religion, or ethnic origin may find themselves inhibited by overbroad prohibitions on telephonic communication from using the telephone to express legitimate grievances against
the perceived inequities imposed by the majority culture. If the aim of
the Chmier is to secure to all persons, regardless of economic means, a
justifiable measure of free expression, then pmiicular care should be
taken in drafting legislation suppressing telephonic communication.42

The dissent in Taylor clearly suggests that where a medium contributes
significantly to the democratic participation rationale, there may be
increased scrutiny in regard to the overbreadth analysis. Accordingly, in
a highly accessible medium, Section 2(b) limitations must be carefully
tailored to ensure a minimal incidental impact on the expression of legal
content.
The Supreme Court decisions in Ramsden and Taylor clearly show
that the medium is relevant to the analysis of freedom of expression
limitations, but only as one factor in the factual context of the case. In
Canada, the medium has not been accepted as the detem1ining factor in
constitutional jurisprudence; there is not a separate standard for broadcasting, telephone, and print media. While there has been no clear
statement as to the relevance of the medium in the Section 1 analysis, the
broad contextual approach taken by Dickson C.J. in Taylor is most
consistent with Canadian constitutional principles. The medium should
only be relevant so far as it inherently contributes to or detracts from the
freedom of expression rationales or directly affects the rational connection, minimal impairment, or the proportionality between the benefits of
regulation and the limitation of the right. The question to be answered
then is how does the Internet relate to the freedom of expression rationales as a medium of communication?

42

Taylor, supra note 18 at 967.
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ill. ALTERING THE PLAYING FIELD:
THE CHALLENGE OF NEW MEDIA

[T]he scope of what human beings can know and do is expanding
exponentially due to technological advance. Not only do new, previously unimagined activities and relationships make it difficult to apply
law developed in another context, but sometimes those new situations
throw into doubt the simpler foundations on which cherished principles were first developed ... Searching for the right metaphors which
relate cyberspace to conventional law is a huge challenge precisely
because there are no precise analogies to cyberspace in the real world.
Moreover, many questions are implicated by the nature of cyberspace
which have never been previously raised and which pose insoluble
problems for legal doctrine as currently constituted. 43

In order to understand how the Internet may affect the balancing of
interests under Section 1, it is necessary to consider aspects of
cyberspace that contribute to or detract from the freedom of expression
rationales or affect the proportionality branch of the Oakes analysis.
This section will review key aspects of online communications that
would implicate these factors but does not aim to provide an exhaustive
analysis of all relevant factors - such an analysis is beyond the scope of
this paper. 44 Rather, this section outlines some of the key issues raised
by cyberspace communications that may impact on the balancing of
interests under the Section 1 analysis.
43

M. Bastarache, J., "The Challenge of the Law in the New Millennium" (1997-1998) 25
Man. L.J. 411, online: QL (MBLJ) at [3] and [12].
44
For example, I have not addressed privacy issues on the Internet. Speaking for the
majority in Taylor, supra note 18, Dickson C.J. (as he then was) recognized that privacy rights
must be considered in assessing Section 2(b) claims:
The connection between s. 2(b) and privacy is thus not to be rashly
dismissed, and I am open to the view that justifications for abrogating the
freedom of expression are less easily envisioned where expressive activity
is not intended to be public, in large part because the hanns which might
arise from the dissemination of meaning are usually minimized when
communication takes place in private, but perhaps also because the freedoms of conscience, thought and belief are particularly engaged in a
private setting.
Privacy aspects of section 2(b) were also central in Supreme Comt of Canada decision in R. v.
Shmpe (2001 ), 194 D.L.R. (4th) 1, upholding the prohibition on possession of child pornography in section 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code R.S.C. 1993, c. 46. The majority limited the
application of s. 163.1 to protect trnly private expression while upholding the general ban on
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1. Democratizing the Marketplace of Ideas: Participation, User
Control and Anonymity
One of the most significant limitations on the meaningful exercise of
freedom of expression rights is scarce resources. Traditional media of
communication tend to be controlled by the few people who own them
or have the·means to purchase access. Furthermore, expression in traditional media is generally subject to the editorial control of its owners and
is often motivated by corporate interests. 45 Accordingly, traditional
media have not allowed the general public a level of access necessary for
meaningful participation in the "marketplace of ideas."46
It may be argued that in this respect, the Internet is vastly different
from traditional media. It allows for a significantly higher proportion of
people to participate in the exchange of ideas, both to express their
views and access infom1ation. 47 The exact number of people participating in online communications is difficult to assess but a study by
IntelliQuest Research estimated that over 100 million adults would be
accessing the Internet in the United States in the year 2000.48 The study

possession of child pornography. Such private expression would include: "(l) any written
material or visual representation created by the accused alone, and held by the accused alone,
exclusively for his or her own personal use; and (2) any visual recording, created by or
depicting the accused, provided it does not depict unlawful sexual activity and is held by the
accused exclusively for private use." While privacy rights will be of significant importance in
assessing Section 2(b) rights on the Internet, a complete analysis of this issue is beyond the
scope of this paper. I believe this issue can be addressed on a case by case basis considering
both the nature of the medium and the particular factual context. The analysis of Dickson C.J.
in Taylor holding that repeated telephone conununications which promote hatred are public
despite the general one-to-one nature of telephone communications sets a positive precedent
as to how this issue should be approached for cyber-communications.
45 See e.g. H. Glassbeek, "Comment: Entrenclunent of Freedom of Speech for the Press Fettering of Freedom of Speech of the People," in Ansisman & Linden, eds., The Media, The
Courts and the Charter, (Toronto: Carswell,1986) at 100. J. Lee, The Internet and First
Amendment Values: Reno v. ACLU and the Democrati::ation of Speech in the Marketplace of
Ideas, (1997) 22 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 61, online: WL (JLR).
46 The problem of limited access was recognized by the Supreme Court in Ramsden, supra
note 36, as a relevant consideration and was central in the Court's refusal to uphold an absolute
ban on postering on public property.
47 See e.g. Lee, supra note 45.
48 IntelliQuest Internet Study Shows 100 Million Adults Online in 2000, online: <http://
www.intelliquest.com/press/release72.asp> (date accessed: 19 March 2000). The IntelliQuest
study uses the "Worldwide Internet/Online Tracking service" which generates profiles of
users and online demographics and estimates a sampling reliability of +/- 1/5%.
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also suggested that the average level of education of users is decreasing.
The percentage of Internet users with a bachelor's degree or greater fell
from 46% to 36%. Furthermore, users with an annual household income
of less than $50,000 US increased from 40% to 45%. In Canada it is
estimated that approximately 13.28 million adults were online as of
December 1999, 42.8% of the Canadian population. This figure represents a marked increase from 1997 when only 4.6 million Canadian
adults were online. 49 The level of access to the Internet clearly supports
the claim that the Internet has allowed for unprecedented levels of
participation and suggests that the marketplace of ideas is no longer the
exclusive domain of an educated and wealthy elite.
Broad participation on the Internet has resulted in a diversity of
views. By facilitating the promotion of traditionally marginalized political and social interests, the Net may be similar in importance to
postering as discussed in Ramsden. Participation demographics suggest
that the mass of information online is trnly representative of the free
market place of ideas as it invites people of all social classes, education,
culture or gender to pa1iicipate without being subject to editorial control.
Jeffery Shallot of Electronic Frontier Canada suggests that it is just this
fact that has led to calls for content regulation. 50 Shallot argues that
speech is segregated into two classes. First-class speech is said to
include traditional media of expression such as books, newspapers and
television. First-class speech is "clean, organized, controlled,
licensed." 51 It is directed from the elite to the masses, "they speak and
we listen" 52 • Conversely, second-class speech is the speech of the
masses. It is:

49
A summary of Canadian usage statistics is available from Nua Internet Surveys, online:
<http://www.nua.ie/surveys/how_many_online_america.html> (date accessed: 31 March
2000). The results posted on the Nua site were generated by sampling surveys conducted by
ComQuest Research, Angeis Reid and AC Nielson. While sampling accuracy for ComQuest
and Angeis Reid study were not available the results are consistent with the AC Neilson results
which estimate accuracy of +/- 1% with a 95% level of confidence, online: <http://
www.acnielsen.ca/sect_intemet/index_inter.htm#3> (date accessed: 31 March 2000).
50
See generally, "The Real Meaning of Cyberspace" The Internet: Beyond the Year
2000,University of Toronto, 1 May 1996, online: Electronic Frontier Canada <http://
insight.mcmaster.ca/org/efc/pages/doc/b2000.html> (date accessed: 2 February 2000).
51
Ibid.
52
Shallot, supra note 50.
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... the right-wing extremism of talk radio, the pornographer's blue
movies, the communists' handbills that implore us to "Smash the
State". It's citizen's band radio, the evangelists' pleas for more money,
and TV shows like "Oprah" and "Geraldo". In second-class speech,
respected pundits don't necessarily rule the day. Second-class speech
is dirty, unorganized, uncontrolled, and unlicensed. Second-class
speech is global. Second-class speech makes us blush. Second-class
speech is disturbing and uncomfortable, because there are, from time
to time, some four-letter words, and some name-calling ... Secondclass speech is the speech of democracy at work. 53

The tension articulated by Mr. Shallot is that while second-class speech
is what Section 2(b) is designed to protect, it is most often the kind of
speech subject to regulation. Mass participation in the marketplace of
ideas, democratic participation of the majority, and the ability to pursue
one's interests are the crux of freedom of expression rights. Accordingly, as the Internet is an ideal medium for facilitating broad distribution of second-class speech, should it not be accorded special constitutional protection?
Despite increased participation, I argue that the democratizing influence of the Internet should not be overemphasized. Access to the Net
still requires a computer with a modem and the payment of connectivity
charges. Participation requires some level of technical expertise. For
example, posting a webpage on the World Wide Web requires knowledge of HTML programming or the financial capacity to purchase
software that assists in web page design. While barriers to access are
low, they continue to exist and those who are denied access due to
fmancial inability are likely to be the most vulnerable in real space.
Cyberspace does not exist in a vacuum; it does not invariably lead to a
brave new world where everyone is equal and free from oppression.
Cyberspace is not a separate entity, it overlays the real world and its
participants are real people. Accordingly, the social cleavages and inequalities in the real world continue to exist.
A ftniher potential limitation on the democratizing impact of new
media is that cyberspace is increasingly becoming a place of c01mnerce.
The increasing significance of e-commerce is clearly demonstrated by
the presence of million dollar television advertisements during the NFL

53

Shallot, supra note 50.
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2000 Superbowl for "dot Com" companies. Furthermore, access to
information is increasingly coming at a price, as user fees become the
norm for online databases. As the potential for profit increases, it is
likely that corporate presence will become dominant and the paiticipation of individual users will be relegated to the margins. 54 For example,
Internet search engines like Realnames.com, which assign certain keywords to particular paying customers, may become the norm. This
would mean that while virtually anyone could publish on the Internet,
only those who pay would be easily found. If this were to occur, then the
participatory nature of the Internet would be little more than an ideological placebo. Although access to the Internet will likely continue to be
less restricted than access to traditional media of expression, it is by no
means exempt from the social forces that marginalized the individual
speaker in the past. In short, accessibility and low barriers to access
alone are not enough to ensure meaningful participation in the market
place of ideas.
Two further factors used to support a high level of scrutiny for online
content regulation are interactivity and enhanced user control over the
flow of infonnation. Unlike radio and television broadcasting, which
transmit messages to be heard and seen by those tuning in, new media
allows for interactive participato1y broadcasting. Individual users can
receive and broadcast, listen and respond. Receiving infonnation on the
Internet generally requires affinnative steps on the part of user by
pointing and clicking on links or typing in web addresses. Furthermore,
filtering software such as Cyber Patrol and Net Nanny or Internet ratings
services allow users to filter out web content that they may find offensive or to limit access by young users. It may be argued that increased
user control may shift the balance of interests between the right of
"freedom of' and "freedom from" expression in favour of the speaker. 55
There are a variety of methods of self-regulating Internet content,
including ratings software, search-tenn blocking, and image recognition
software. Ratings software requires either self-rating of web material or
54

For a discussion of how corporate presence on the Internet and corporate control of the
infrastructure of cyberspace has detracted from online democratic participation see D.
Gutstein, E.con: How the Internet Undermines Democracy (Toronto: Stoddati Publishing,
1999).
55
See Anonymous, "The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment 011 the Infonnation Superhighway" (l 994) 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1062, online: WL (JLR).
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third party rating. Both of these approaches provide imperfect solutions.
Self-rating is problematic, as it requires individuals to judge the nature
and quality of their own publications and is likely to yield inconsistent
results. Third party rating leaves decisions of appropriateness to the
moral judgements of others, whose beliefs may or may not accord with
those of individual users. Search term blocking allows users to block
access to websites that contain particular words like "sex" or "nudity".
This type of blocking mechanism, while perhaps more effective, has the
effect of blocking access to a significant amount of political, educational
and artistic Internet content which may be desirable or have significant
social utility for young users. Also, seemingly innocuous searches for
words like "teen" could lead to pornographic material. 56 Image recognition software is in its developing stages and as yet does not provide an
effective means of restricting web access. 57 Thus blocking technology
currently yields imperfect results and has a limited impact on user
control.
The level of interactivity of Internet content varies depending upon
the fonn of the communications and the decisions of the publisher. It is
entirely possible for Internet content, like webpages, to take the form of
one-way co1mnunications. Although enhanced, both user control and
interactivity are dependent upon the particular circumstances of the
case. Furthennore, the affirmative steps argument was found to be
unpersuasive by the majority of the Supreme Court in Taylor in regard
to telephone hate messages. Accordingly, user control and interactivity
should not be overemphasized and do not justify strict scrutiny of
constitutional violations independent of other considerations.
One further aspect of Internet communications that may be relevant
to the balancing of interests under Section 1 is the relative anonymity of
Internet users. Anonymity has historically been recognized as facilitating freedom of expression in the face of intimidation - the secret ballot
was believed to be essential to ensuring meaningful democratic participation. The Internet allows users to hide behind pseudonyms, to distance
themselves from communications using free on-line email services and
56 D. Djavaherian, "III. First Amendment a) Indecency: Reno v. ACLU," 13 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 371, online: WL (JLR).
57
For a more thorough examination of the limitations of blocking software see ibid; J.
Semitsu, "Burning Cyberbooks in Public Libraries: Internet filtering software vs. the First
Amendment," (2000) 52 Stan. L. Rev. 509, online: WL (JLR).
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free web-publishing space. Accordingly, it may be argued that the
anonymity provided by the Internet allows those who are the subject of
hateful or obscene material to stand up and oppose belittling expressive
content without the same fear of backlash that would be felt in real
space. It could also be argued that self-defense in the marketplace of
ideas, matching words with words, may be a better way of promoting
self-worth and dignity than paternalistic government intervention. The
problem with this position is that it would place the burden on vulnerable groups to defend themselves against attack and this would not be
consistent with Canada's constitutional commitment to fostering
multiculturalism and equality. Furthermore, anonymity allows people to
communicate offensive and illegal material without taking responsibility for their actions.
Canadian Courts have clearly recognized the need to protect unpopular or even offensive content. 58 Jeffery Shallot's "second class"
speech has been legally recognized as being at the core of freedom of
expression rights. The question for constitutional interpreters in considering criminal and regulated content online is: Do the low bruTiers to
access, viewpoint diversity, anonymity and user control shift the balance
of interests in favour of the speaker and suppo1i a higher level of scrutiny
for on-line content regulation?
2. Limits on Enforceability: The Technological Nature of the
Internet and Jurisdiction

One of the primary challenges to effective Internet regulation is the
structure of the Internet itself. Information is not transferred in a systematic linear manner as the "information superhighway" analogy suggests.
The Internet does not have a central control center that may be regulated
but consists of a nexus of sub-nets. The technology was designed in
order to resist censorship rerouting infonnation should blockages occur.
As a result, the Internet naturally resists any attempt to restrict the
transfer of information inhibiting the technological enforceability of
laws aimed at content regulation. 59
See for example R. v. Zundel, supra note 20.
D. Theall, "Canada, Censorship, and the Internet" in K. Peterson & A. Hutchinson eds.,
Censorship in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), online:
<www.catalaw.com/logic/docs/dt-censor.html> (date accessed: 2 February 2000).
58

59
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This problem is intensified by the difficulty in distinguishing the
content of information being transferred over the Internet. The same
lines of communication are used in the transmission of political messages, to engage in e-commerce, and for educational purposes as are
used for the promotion of hatred and the distribution of child pornography. All of this information is broken down into bytes of code and sent
piece by piece from sender to user. While it is possible for system
operators to block particular newsgroups or use firewall technology to
block access to particular servers, this sort of content restriction is rather
easily avoided. In order to ensure the continued flow of infonnation,
users may merely start up newsgroups under different names, which are
then carried by system operators, or may post "mirrorsites" on other
Internet servers so that the flow of information continues. 60 Furthermore, a technological blocking mechanism would have a severe chilling
effect, restricting access to a significant amount of non-offensive expression due to its imprecision. Thus, the nature of Internet communications makes it extremely difficult to effectively restrict access to illegal
and offensive materials. On the other hand, the nature of
cyberc01mnunications is not fixed. Some have suggested that it may be
possible to increase the effectiveness of content regulation by regulating
the code which is the backbone of cyberspace. 61
Jurisdictional limitations also restrict the effectiveness of online
regulation. The Internet is international in nature and enforceability of

60 The difficulty of blocking the flow of inf01mation on the net was demonstrated by the
failure of such actions to stop the flow of information in compliance with the media ban on the
Paul Bernardo, Karla Holmolka Case. In order to ensure continued discussion of the events of
the trial, newsgroups that were dropped merely restarted under different names which were
once again carried by system operators. For a discussion of the effect of the Internet on the
Bemardo/Holmolka media ban see D. Wisbrod, "Controlling the Uncontrollable: Regulating
the Internet" (1995) 4 M.C.L.R. 331, online: <www.catalaw.com/dov/docs/dw-inet.htm>
(date accessed: IO February, 2000). A similar problem occmred when the Getman government
attempted to block access to Ernst Zundel's anti-Semitic web site located on a U.S. server (The
Zundelsite). In blocking access to the Zm1delsite, Gennan authorities had to restrict access to
the entire Webcom server that carried his page. Censoring the site led to a backlash and the
proliferation of mirrorsites which meant that the content could still be accessed by people in
Germany from other servers. See Electronic Frontier Canada, Press Release, "Net Censorship
Backfires" (I Febrnary 1996), online: <gopher://insight.mcmaster.ca:70/00/org/efc/pr/efcpr.O l feb96>.
61 See L. Lessig,, "The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach" (1999) 113 Harv.
L. Rev. 501.
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individual government regulation is generally limited by physical territory. Jurisdictional issues in cyberspace have not been resolved and
many questions remain. For example, is jurisdiction to be determined by
the location of the speaker, the server, or the person receiving the
information? Is it enough for a Canadian to relocate a web page to a
foreign server to avoid the sanctions imposed by Canadian law? How
would extradition treaties apply to online activities where content posted
in one's home country is accessed in a foreign jurisdiction? I do not aim
here to answer the many questions raised by jurisdictional limitations in
cyberspace; such an analysis is well beyond the scope of this paper. 62 It
is enough for my purposes to recognize that the difficulty in asserting
jurisdiction over foreign web pages or communicators and the ability of
Canadians to post material to foreign servers makes it difficult for
Canadian laws aimed at content regulation to effectively achieve their
stated objectives. This difficulty stems from the fact that in the absence
of intemational agreement, many Intemet users committing offences
under Canadian laws will be beyond the reach of Canadian law enforcement agencies. Jurisdictional limitations mean that even if Canadian
laws deter those within its jurisdiction from engaging in the expression
of illegal or regulated content, they are unlikely to be effective in
stopping the flow of illegal content to and from foreign jurisdictions.
The limits of territorial jurisdiction, in combination with the
Intemet's natural resistance to censorship, severely restrict the effectiveness of any content-based criminal or regulatory law. Limitations on
offensive content that would be justified tmder Section 1 in real space
could be said to be valueless on the Intemet because they simply cannot
efficiently achieve their goals. This dilenuna calls into question the
rational connection aspect of the Oakes Test and may shift the balance of
interests between the limitation of the individual right and the benefits of
govemment action. If effective enforcement is not possible, should
cyber-expression be restricted at all? At the very least, should the limited
effectiveness of such govemment action be subject to stringent review
and a high burden of justification?

62
For a discussion of jurisdictional issues in cyberspace see Ogilvy Renault Internet
Group,"Jurisdiction and the Internet: Are Traditional Rules enough?", online:
<www.law.ualbe1ia.ca/alri/ulc/cmTent/ejurisd.htm> (date accessed: 24 March 2000).
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3. Transposing Old Laws to New Technology: Manufacturing
Legislative Intent
Context is extremely important in ascribing meaning to statutory
language or general legal principles. Accordingly, the new media context may impact the interpretation of new laws or be incompatible with
previous definitions. The Supreme Court decision in R. v. Butler63
suggests that the medium of expression will not be relevant in defining
broad value-laden terminology like "obscenity" but there are certain
laws that will require translation in order to properly apply to the
Internet. Transposing old laws to new technological contexts could give
rise to unique constitutional challenges. In application to new media, it
may be difficult to justify deference to legislative intent and expertise
when this context was not considered in drafting the law. Central to this
analysis is the problem of unintended consequences and "overbreadth".
As a full consideration of content-based criminal and regulatory
laws is beyond the scope of this paper,64 I will consider the example of
Section 13(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act65 upheld by the
63 [1992] l S.C.R. 4. In Butler the court rnled that Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46,
s. 159 (nows. 163 was not an unpennissible limitation on freedom of expression rights and
was not void for vagueness. Section 163 (8) states that "any publication a dominant characteristic of which is the undue exploitation of sex, or of sex and any one or more of ... crime,
hotTor, cruelty and violence, shall be deemed to be obscene". Employing the community
standards test the majority held that the portrayal of sex coupled with violence will almost
always constitute the undue exploitation of sex. Explicit sex which is degrading or dehumanizing may be undue if the risk of hann is substantial and explicit sex that is not violent and
neither degrading nor dehumanizing is generally tolerated in our society and will not qualify
as the undue exploitation of sex unless it employs children in its production. TI1e dissent, per
L'Heureux-Dube and Gonthier JJ., suggested that the context of expression should influence
the application of the community standards test. Pursuant to this approach communications
that are pennissible in some circumstances may be criminally obscene in others and the
medium of expression could influence this analysis. This position was rejected by the majority
which focused on the content of expression in relation to national community standards in
detennining what is criminally obscene. Butler suggests that the medium of expression will
not influence the meaning of nonnative tenninology such as "obscene."
64
For a further discussion of the application of existing laws to the Internet see The
Cyberspace is not a "no laiv land": a study of the issues of liability for content circulating on
the Internet, supra note 3.
65
R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6 [hereinafter the Act]. Section 13(1) of the Act states that:
It is a discriminato1y practice for a person or a group of persons acting in
conceti to communicate telephonically or to cause to be so communicated,
repeatedly, in whole or in part by means of the facilities of a telecommtmication undertaking within the legislative authority of Parliament, any
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Supreme Court of Canada in Taylor. 66 This section makes it a discriminatory practice to "communicate telephonically67 or to cause to be so
communicated, repeatedly," anything likely to expose a person or persons to hatred or contempt due the fact that they are identifiable on the
basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination. Section 13 excludes from
liability any matter communicated in whole or in part by means of a
broadcasting undertaking68 and owners and operators of telecommunications undertakings69 •
As the Supreme Court indicated in Taylor, there is no intent requirement in Section 13. The majority of the Court did not believe this was
problematic because the purpose of the Act is to promote human rights
and not merely to prevent intentional wrongdoing. In cyberspace, the
lack of an intent requirement may become more problematic. For example, if websites devoted to combating hatred contain links to socalled "hatesites", could they be prosecuted under the Act?70 It would
appear that such a situation would be covered by Section 13, despite the
fact that it was clearly the intention of the website administrator to
combat the promotion ofhatred. 71 Each time a person clicked on the link
matter that is likely to expose a person or persons to hatred or contempt by
reason of the fact that that person or those persons are identifiable on the
basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination.
66
This is an interesting case study as the Commission is cuffently trying to prosecute Ernst
Zundel for his anti-Semitic website. The "Zundelsite" case has not been resolved at the time of
writing but could lead to a consideration of the implications of the Internet on the interpretation of constitutional rights. Zm1del raised this issue in Federal Court but the Court held that it
was premature to decide the issue as the Human Rights Tribunal had not yet decided the
matter. See Ziindel v. Canada (Attorney General), [2000] F.C.J. No. 2057 (online: QL).
67
While there are interesting issues as to whether communications in cyberspace would be
interpreted as "telephonic c01mnunications," such a discussion is not central to ;1 Section 2(b)
argument and is beyond the scope of this analysis. For a discussion of the application of
Canada's hate and obscenity laws to cyberspace generally see The Cyberspace is not a "no law
land": a study of the issues of liability for content circulating on the Internet, supra note 3.
68
Canadian Human Rights Act, supra note 64, s. 13(2).
69
Canadian Human Rights Act, supra note 64, s. 13(3).
70
See for example, online: <http://www.hatewatch.org>, a web site devoted to combating
hatred on the Internet which has links to many hate websites around the world. Similarly,
online: <http://www.nizkor.org>, a website devoted to holocaust education contains writings
of famous holocaust deniers like Ernst Zundel
71
See for example the decision of the Copyright Board in Statement of Royalties to be
Collected for the Pe1formance or the Communication by Telecommunication, in Canada, of
Musical or Dramatico-Musical Works, [1999] C.B.D. No. 5 (online: QL). This decision dealt
with Tariff 22 which outlined a royalty sttucture for online music transmissions and asse1ted
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to the hatesite it could be argued that the administrator of the antidiscrimination site caused hateful messages to be communicated. This
would be so despite the fact that the purpose of the site as a whole was to
combat discrimination. This sort of linkage was not possible in the
context of telephone answering machines and therefore was not considered when the law was drafted. Such an application would seem to
strengthen the concerns of Justice McLachlin's dissent in Taylor regarding the overbreadth of Section 13 as discussed in Part 1. Links may also
be viewed as weakening Chief Justice Dickson's position in regard to
the offending material itself as it places the offensive expression in the
context of a debate. Such debate is central to the truth seeking rationale
of freedom of expression rights.
Another problem with the application of Section 13 of the Act to the
Internet is that it could result in different treatment for Internet communications via a broadcasting undertaking and those communicated via a
telecommunications undertaking. This distinction seems odd, as the
Internet Service Provider rather than the content of the communications
would detennine the application of the Act, insulating some users and
exposing others to liability. This sort of problem would have been
unlikely to occur in the past because the general public would not have
been able to communicate via a broadcasting undertaking. Furthermore,
broadcasting was subject to content regulation imposed by the Canadian
Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, which has refused to assert control over cyberspace. 72 Such an unprincipled distinction is problematic, as it could sever the rational connection between the
law and the government objective.
the boards position regarding online liability for royalties. In Pali III C. I. the Board asse1is
that the person who posts infonnation on the Web is the person who is liable for breach of
copyright law. It is at that point that the offending matter is communicated to the public as
eve1ything necessary has been done to make it so available. In Part III D 2 the Board asselis
that a person who has an embedded link on their website to music downloads will also be
liable for authorizing the transmission of copyrighted material. This suggests that it may be
possible for a person to be liable for works transmitted from other websites if they directly link
to the copyrighted material. In the context of s. 13.l it could be argued that the embedded link
similarly causes the communication of hateful expression. On the other hand, the issue of
liability will be influenced by its context. In regard to a website aimed at combating hatred, the
material must be understood within its context holistically.
72
Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission, News Release
"CRTC Won't Regulate the Internet" (17 May,1999), online: <www.crtc.gc.ca/ENG/NEWS/
RELEASES/l 999/R9905 l 7e.htm> (date accessed: 3 March, 2000).
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The problems raised by the nature of Internet communications
clearly demonstrate that existing law may not be well tailored to deal
with the issues raised by new media. Furthennore, it may be more
difficult to justify a deferential approach to government action, as it is
impossible for the legislature to have conceived of, let alone intend
particular consequences of Section 13 in application to online communications. While it may be possible to interpret old laws in ways that are
consistent with their application to the Internet, Canadian courts must
not overstep their role as interpreters of the law and become lawmakers.
Hence, where application to new media leads to ludicrous results or
increases concerns regarding chilling effect and overbreadth, it may be
difficult to justify a deferential standard to a non-existent legislative
intent.

IV. FREEDOM OF SPEECH: FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE
AMERICAN RESPONSE TO THE INTERNET

As demonstrated in Part II, the impact of the Internet on both society
and the law remains unclear. The democratizing effect of cyberspace is
uncertain, jurisdictional problems have not been resolved, the nature of
the Internet defies technological censorship, and existing laws were not
designed to address these challenges. While there are cunently no
Canadian Court decisions considering the impact of cyberspace on
freedom of expression rights73 , the issue has already been considered by
the United States Supreme Court. Although American jurisprudence
does not bind Canadian Courts it may be influential, especially in
emerging areas where there is no Canadian precedent. Thus, it is important to consider American jurispmdence regarding online expression.
The First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States
asserts that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press." Unlike the Charter, the American constitution
does not contain a limitation clause similar to Section 1. Accordingly,
73
This issue was raised in Zundel v. Canada (Attorney General) et. al, supra note 65. That
case deals with the application of the Human Rights act s. 13 to Ernst Zundel' s website. The
Federal Court of Appeal did not decide the issue holding it was prematme as the Human
Rights Tribunal had not yet ruled on the matter.
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the First Amendment on its face extends complete protection to individual expression. 74 Because the American constitution does not include a limitation clause, U.S. courts have had a difficult time justifying
First Amendment violations even where the objectives are compelling. 75 In order to avoid this analytical dilemma, American Courts have
excluded "low value" speech from constitutional protection at the definition stage, asserting that some content is not speech at all. 76 Furthermore, limitations have been allowed where there is a pressing objective
but the restriction must employ the least drastic means. This test is
strictly applied, as content-based limitations on speech are presumptively invalid.
Despite the rigid framework for freedom of speech analysis in
American jurisprudence, U.S. courts have justified more significant
intrusions in some forums of communication by adopting mediumspecific standards of scrutiny.
This "medium-specific" approach to the regulation of mass communications considers each medium separately and applies a balancing
approach of competing government interests to each fo1m in a slightly
different manner. The Court therefore examines the underlying technology and unique characteristics of each new form of communication
before detennining whether there is a governmental interest which
might outweigh the First Amendment interest in unrestrained speech
over that particular medium. 77
The main considerations in allowing for a lower standard of review
are the pervasiveness of the medium and scarcity concerns that limit
participation. American jurisprudence affords a high level of protection
to print media, which was central in the minds of the Fathers of Confederation. However, lower levels of scrutiny have been adopted in regard
to new technologies to justify government limitations in the public
interest.
The lowest level of scrutiny adopted by U.S. Courts applies to radio
and television broadcasting and was adopted in FCC v. Pacifica Foun74

Expressive actions are also protected as symbolic speech under the First Amendment.
P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, supra note 8 at 851.
76 For example obscenity has been excluded from the definition of "speech" in American
jurisprndence. See for example, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
77
S. Jacques, "Reno v. ACLU: Insulating the Internet, The First Amendment, and the
Marketplace ofldeas" 46 Am. U. L. Rev. 1945 at 1956, online: WL (JLR).
75
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dation 78 • In Pacifica the Court considered a Federal Communications
Commission regulation that restricted the broadcast of indecent material, some of which was protected by the First Amendment. The Couti
held that it was constitutionally pennissible to punish a broadcaster for
broadcasting material which is offensive but not constitutionally obscene if aired at a time when children may be in the audience. A lower
standard of review was imposed, as the broadcast mediutn is highly
pervasive and accessible. Broadcast content is pervasive in that it invades the home and is easily accessible by turning on the radio or
television and selecting a channel. Furthermore, it is difficult for parents
or users to restrict access to television and radio content. 79 Another
justification for limiting First Amendment rights in broadcast media is
viewpoint scarcity. This scarcity occurs because there are a limited
number of broadcasters that can be accommodated by the limited capacity of the electromagnetic spectrum. 80
After Pacifica, American Courts have continued to rely upon the
medium specific approach in assessing challenges to freedom of speech
violations in telephone communications and cable television. In Sable
Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC81 , the Court considered an
FCC ban on indecent telephone messages and held that telephone communications were uniquely different from broadcasting and warranted a
higher degree of constitutional protection. The Court held that use of the
telephone required affirmative steps in order to access infom1ation.
Accordingly, it was found to be less accessible to children than broadcast media. The fact that a captive audience is not bombarded by
unwanted content was also found to be compelling. Similarly, in Turner
Broadcasting Systems v. FCC82 , the court held that cable broadcasting
deserved a higher level of protection than traditional broadcasting.
Cable broadcasting differs from traditional television and radio broadcasting since the user purchases the service and selects a package of
78

438 U.S. 726 (1978), online: WL (SCT) [hereinafter Pacifica].
Since Pacifica was decided, channel blocking technology has been developed for
televisions. Despite this fact, the same level of scrntiny appears to apply to television
broadcasting. This technological development demonstrates the problems of adopting medium
specific levels of scrutiny in the face of ever changing technology.
80
Anonymous, "The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Infonnation
Superhighway," supra note 54 at 1064.
81
492 U.S. 115 (1989), online: WL (SCT) [hereinafter Sable].
82 512 U.S. 622 (1994) [hereinafter Turner], online: WL (SCT).
79
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programming for a monthly fee. Thus, there is a greater degree of user
control over the content received. 83
As a whole, the medium-specific approach allows for a spectrum of
standards of review to be detennined by the technological characteristics of the medium, specifically pervasiveness and scarcity concerns. In
ACLUv. Reno84 , the United States Supreme Court applied the mediumspecific approach to the Internet for the first time. The challenge in
ACLU dealt with a number of sections of the Communications Decency
Act 1996,85 which criminalized the distribution of obscene or indecent
matter on the Internet86 • In finding these sections to be unconstitutional,
the Court affirmed the medium-specific approach and found that strict
scrutiny should be applied to content regulations of online expression.
To justify a strict scrutiny standard, the Court distinguished the
Internet from traditional broadcast media. The Court agreed with the
District Court 87 that Internet content does not invade the user's home in
the same manner as radio or television. 88 Like telephone communications in Sable, the reception of Internet content requires a series of
affirmative steps by the user. Further, the Court acknowledged that
much of the indecent communications on the Internet are preceded by
wamings89 and are rarely encountered by accident.

83

Anonymous, "The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information
Superhighway," supra note 54 at 1063.
84 521 U.S. 844; 117 S.Ct.2329, online: WL (SCT) [cited to U.S.] [hereinafter ACLU].
85
47 U.S.C.A (West Supp. 1997) [hereinafter CDA].
86 Specifically, the challenge considered § 223 (a) and §223 (d) of the CDA. Section
223(a)(l)(B) provides that any person who, "by means of a teleco1mnunications device,"
"knowingly ... makes, creates, or solicits" and "initiates the transmission" of "any comment,
request, suggestion, proposal, image or other communication which is obscene or indecent,
knowing that the recipient of the conununication is under 18 years of age," "shall be criminally
fined or imprisoned." Section 223(d)(l) makes it a crime to use an "interactive computer
service" to "send" or "display in a manner available" to a person under age 18, "any conunent,
request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication that, in context, depicts or
describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contempora1y c01mnunity standards,
sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless of whether the user of such service placed
the call or initiated the communication." Sections 223 (a)(2) and (d)(2) imposed sanctions on
those who pennit telecommunications facilities under their control to be used in a manner
proscribed in§§ 223 (a)(l) and (d)(l).
87 ACLUv. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), online: WL (DCT).
88 ACLU, supra note 81 at 869. Justice O'Co1mor's dissent did not challenge the finding of
strict scrntiny for First Amendment violations in cyberspace.
89 ACLU, supra note 80 at 869.

132 - DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

The Court also rejected the scarcity rationale in application to the
Internet, having been heavily influenced by viewpoint diversity and the
democratizing impact of cyberspace. The majority stated that the
Internet:
... provides relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication
of all kinds ... This dynamic, multifaceted category of communication
includes not only traditional print and news services, but also audio,
video, and still images, as well as interactive, real-time dialogue.
Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can
become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could
from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and
newsgroups, the same individual can become a pamphleteer. As the
District Comt found, "the content on the Internet is as diverse as
human thought." 929 F.Supp., at 842 (finding 74). We agree with its
conclusion that our cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of
First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium. 90

Having found that strict scrutiny applies to online communications, the
Court held that the CDA was unconstitutionally vague and overly broad
as it prohibited many adults from accessing constitutionally protected
speech and included a significant amount of non-commercial and nonpornographic artistic and educational material91 •
The Court also held that the limitation did not minimally impair the
right. In deciding this point, the Court was influenced by the existence of
blocking software, which constituted a reasonable alternative to government action. 92 The relevant sections of the CDA were not saved by the
affirmative defences, which applied where a transmitter has effectively
limited access through means such as credit card verification.93 • Considering the importance of the Internet to the exercise of freedom of speech,
the Court felt that the significant economic burdens involved in setting
up such verification procedures placed too high a burden on online
participants. 94 Thus, overall, the Courts adopted the rationales discussed
in Part II to justify strict scrutiny review for online expression.
The arguments against restricting online expression are numerous
and compelling. While the issue has not, thus far, been pronounced upon
90

ACLU, supra note 80 at 870.
ACLU, supra note 80 at 879.
92 ACLU, supra note 80 at 877.
93
CDA, supra note 81, § 223 (e) (5).
94
ACLU, supra note 80 at 882.
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in Canadian Courts, such a challenge is likely to arise in the near future.
The question for interpreters of the Charter will be whether or not they
will adopt a strict scrutiny standard for online content regulation in the
Section 1 analysis. More generally, the difficulty will be in how to
consider the balancing of interests of online speakers?

v. THE INTERNET AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN
CANADA - Is THE MEDIUM THE MESSAGE?

In R. v. Rahey, 95 La Forest J. asserted that:
[w]hile it is natural and even desirable for Canadian comis to refer to
American constitutional jurisprudence in seeking to elucidate the
meaning of Charter guarantees that have counterpa1is in the United
States Constitution, they should be wary of drawing too ready a
parallel between constitutions born to different countries in different
ages and in very different circumstances, paiiicularly given the substantive implications of both s. I and s. 24( l) of the Charter. Canadian
legal thought has at many points in the past deferred to that of the
British; the Charter will be no sign of our national maturity if it simply
becomes an excuse for adopting another intellectual mentor. American
jurisprudence, like the British, must be viewed as a tool, not as a
master. 96 [emphasis added]

The principled approach to constitutional analysis, based upon a consideration of broad constitutional and social values is central to Canadian
Charter jurisprudence. When viewed in isolation, new media would
appear to strongly supp01i the freedom of expression rationales. However, to consider the medium of expression in this manner would be
inconsistent with the Canadian constitutional interpretive tradition.
The medium-specific approach is unprincipled and often based upon
a flimsy understanding of modern technology at a single moment in
time; commonly when technology is in its nascent stages of development.97 Accordingly, many American critics have called for a rejection

[I 987] 1 S.C.R. 588.
Ibid, at 639.
97
See Anonymous, "The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Infonnation Superhighway;" supra note 54 at 1063.
95

96
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of the medium specific approach, in favour of what I believe is the
current Canadian approach adopted in decisions like Taylor and
Ramsden.
Technological charactetistics ... should not be the crucial factor in
dete1mining the protection a message receives under the First Amendment. A political editorial is still a political editorial whether it is
printed in a newspaper, broadcast as a teletext on a television screen,
downloaded from a computer network, or faxed over a phone line. To
the extent that technology is relevant at all, the Court should focus not
on the medium of transmission, but on the relationship between technological characteristics of the medium and the underlying First
Amendment values at issue. Rather than resting upon ever-changing
technologies to justify government regulation of the electronic media,
First Amendment analysis should strip away the technological characteristics of the media. The Court should ground its analysis in essential
First Amendment interests and draw upon salient technological characteristics only as the factual background against which the real First
Amendment concerns must be applied. 98

A consideration of all factors indicates that a medium-specific strict
scrutiny test for Internet cmmnunications would not be appropriate in
the Canadian context: it would be inconsistent with Canadian precedent
in Ramsden and Taylor and would ignore the importance of full contextual analysis. The relevant technological and social implications of the
medium of communication should not be determinative in the constitutional review of Section 2(b) violations. Rather, it should be considered
as one aspect of the contextual analysis under Section 1.
As I pointed out in my discussion of the democratizing aspects of
cyberspace, the positive effects of low barriers to access, user control
and anonymity are far from certain truth. While these aspects of
cyberspace do allow for a more meaningful exercise of freedom of
98

See Anonymous, "The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Infonnation Superhighway" supra note 54 at 1063; L. Tribe, "The Constitution in Cyberspace: Law
and Liberty Beyond the Electronic Frontier" (The First Conference on Computers, Freedom &
Privacy, Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, Burlingame, California, 1991),
online: <http://www.cpsr.org/conferences/cfp9 l/tribe2.html> (date accessed: 19 March,
2000). See also, L. Lessig, "Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace" (1996) 45 Emory L..T.
869, online: WL (JLR). In this note Lessig suggests that in translating constitutional analysis
across contexts, one must adapt to the context but remain true to fi.mdamental principles. See
also, S. Jacques, "Reno v. ACLU: Insulating the Internet, The First Amendment, And the
Marketplace of Ideas" 46 Am. U. L. Rev. 1945.
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expression rights, an increased corporate presence on the Web may
dilute this effect. Furthermore, low barriers to access facilitate increased
circulation of offensive hate propaganda and obscenity, thereby increasing the damage these types of expression may cause to the social
fabric. 99 In enabling users to frame these ideas in slick webpages and by
facilitating access in the privacy of one's home, the Internet may allow
transmitters of hate speech and obscenity to create a veneer of credibility
increasing the damage caused. 100 Accordingly, many of the arguments
supporting a high level of scrutiny of government content regulation
may be turned on their head to justify government action.
In discussing how the nature of the Internet and territorial jurisdiction place significant limitations on the enforceability of online content
regulation, I made reference to the fact that technological regulation
may be possible by first regulating the code which is the backbone of the
Internet 101 • A full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this
paper, but it serves as an important reminder. Although technology,
when it is broadly accepted, seems to take on a life of its own, we must
not allow it to define social values and the meaning of important
constitutional rights. The Internet is a technology created, controlled and
designed by human users. Accordingly, it is possible to alter that technology. In either case, technological development does not fundamenThis position was supported by the minority decision in R. v. Sharpe, (2001) 194 D.L.R.
(4th) I. Citing the Criminal Intelligence Service Canada's Annual Report on Organi=ed
Crime in Canada (2000), at p. 13 the minority adopted the position that:
"The distribution of child pornography is growing proportionately with
the continuing expansion of Internet use. Chat rooms available throughout the Internet global community finiher facilitate and compound this
problem. The use of the Internet has helped pornographers to present and
promote their point of view." Criminalizing the possession of child pornography may reduce the market for child pornography and decrease the
exploitative use of children in its production.
The majority decision did not comment on the implications of the Internet in regard to the
dissemination of hate speech and obscenity but rather focused largely on the public/private
divide in defining the scope of the impugned law. Despite the important role of the Internet in
the distribution of child pornography, the majority focused on the values at stake rather than
the mode of expression.
100 In Taylor, supra note 18 at 937, Chief Justice Dickson was concerned that "authors of
hate messages are able tlu·ough subtle manipulation and juxtaposition of material to give a
veneer of credibility to the content of the messages." 111e Internet if anything magnifies this
concern as a result of anonymity and the ability to create credible presentation.
101
See L. Lessig, "The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach", supra note 60.
99
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tally alter the values of democratic society and should not be allowed to
independently determine what sort of government action is allowed in
the protection of vulnerable groups.
Although territorial jurisdiction is problematic on the Internet and
could damage the rational connection and balancing of interests under
the Oakes analysis, imposing restrictions on hate propaganda and obscenity online continues to have value. No national law can be expected
to cure all of society's ills, but if its objective is rationally connected to
the limitation of rights, jurisdictional limitations should not be relied
upon to strike down the law. Although many of those who violate
Canadian laws will be beyond their reach, the principles embodied in
applying criminal and regulatory sanction to hate speech and obscenity
continue to have value. For example, holding those within jurisdiction
accountable for their actions in violating Canadian hate and obscenity
laws demonstrates a continued c01mnitment to the principles of equality
and multiculturalism embodied in the Charter. 102 The fact that laws are
not a perfect solution is not enough to completely destroy the rational
connection between Charter violations and the objective of fostering a
tolerant multicultural society. The fact remains that these types of
expression do not significantly promote the freedom of expression

102
See for example, Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister ofJustice),
(2000) 193 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (online: QL). Speaking for the majority Binnie J. notes at [17]:
The administrative burden of identifying prohibited goods in such a vast
inflow of material is enonnous. In an era of increased volumes of crossborder material, and reduced government resources, the difficulty of perfonning the Parliamentary mandate cannot be underestimated. The task of
properly reviewing a single CD-Rom, featuring the usual a1rny of photographs, film and text, would require far more time than Customs officials
are realistically able to devote to the task. Moreover, with the exponential
growth of pornographic sites on the Internet, the baffier to the passage
across the border· of hard copy material may some day be seen as of
marginal importance to the enforcement of anti-obscenity
laws. Nevertheless, if the Parliamentaty mandate is to be caiTied out with
regard not only to the larger public interest served by the Criminal Code
but also to the tights of individuals who claim to be engaged in entirely
lawful activities, adequate procedures and resources must be put in place
to operate the border scheme in a manner that respects Charter ri!!hts.
[emphasis added]
In adopting this position Binnie J. recognizes that imperfection of a law and difficulty of
enforcement may not independently invalidate a law aimed at protecting a public good if
important values are at stake.
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rationales, their content is in tension with competing Charter values of
equality and multiculturalism and increased accessibility and transmission may magnify the damage these sorts of expression cause to the
Canadian social fabric.
The final issue that I addressed in Part II is the difficulty of transposing old laws onto new media. In discussing this problem, I indicated that
in applying existing law to the Internet, concerns in regard to overbreadth and vagueness may be magnified and deference would be
difficult to justify as the context of the Internet was not considered at the
time of drafting. Although the nature of Internet communications must
be considered as part of the contextual Section 1 analysis, I do not think
that the problem of translation will definitively lead to a finding that
application to the Net is unconstitutional or legislative in nature. Considering the example of the anti-hate website with links to hate propaganda, a full understanding of the nature of Net communications would
likely lead to a finding that there was no violation in this case. While
focusing on links to offensive material would suggest that a website
operator would be causing hateful material to be communicated, viewing the link in the context ofthe·site as a whole would lead to a different
result. If the general content of the site aims at combating hatred, the
inclusion of links to hate propaganda would not be determinative. The
meaning of the content viewed holistically would lead to the opposite
conclusion and such a finding would be consistent with a thorough
contextual and purposive analysis. Accordingly, while it may be difficult to rely on legislative intent, a contextual purposive analysis, informed by the technological workings of cyberspace, in combination
with a broad understanding of legislative purpose may allow laws to be
transposed onto cyberspace without violating constitutional principles.
Such an analysis would not involve the court in the lawmaking process,
but rather allow the court to fulfill Parliament's purpose in a changing
society. 103 Laws are often broadly defined just to allow this sort of
flexibility.

103 This is consistent with the majority approach in R. v. Sharpe, supra note 94A,which
clearly asse1ied that laws should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Charter if such
an interpretation is possible and consistent with legislative intention. In that case the court read
down the law in order to allow it to achieve its objectives in a constitutionally pennissible
manner.
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The Internet undoubtedly raises a number of challenges to legislative interpretation, some of which could give rise to constitutional
challenges. One particular problem I have not addressed is the challenge
of defining public and private spaces online. In Taylor, Dickson C.J.
recognized that privacy rights must be considered in assessing Section
2(b):
The connection between s. 2(b) and plivacy is thus not to be rashly
dismissed, and I am open to the view that justifications for abrogating
the freedom of expression are less easily envisioned where expressive
activity is not intended to be public, in large part because the harms
which might arise from the dissemination of meaning are usually
minimized when communication takes place in private, but perhaps
also because the freedoms of conscience, thought and belief are particularly engaged in a private setting. 104

Despite this fact, Dickson's analysis of telephone communications, their
purpose and the context sets an excellent example of how these problems may be resolved online. Returning to the Comi's decision in
Taylor, we may ask if a different result would have been reached if the
Act were to directly address new media. Leaving aside the issue as to
whether Internet communications are "telephonic" in nature, I do not
believe that it would. The fact remains that hate speech does not contribute to the freedom of expression rationales, there is a rational connection
between the purpose of facilitating an inclusive and tolerant
multicultural society and the restriction of online hate speech. Fmihermore, application of the Act to online expression would not alter the
minimal impairment analysis and concerns about the chilling effect of
the legislation would be no more significant than in considering telephone co1mnunications. Like the telephone, the Internet is an effective
tool for those wishing to promote hatred. It allows access to a broad
audience, maintains a more private personal contact, and the ability to
hide behind apparently credible websites and anonymity. Accordingly,

104

Tay/01; supra note 18 at 936 to 937. Privacy aspects of section 2(b) were also central in
the British Columbia appeal decision in R. v. Sharpe, [1999) B.C.J. No. 1555; ovenuled
(2001) 194 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (SCC), declaring the prohibition on possession of child pornography in section 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code R.S.C. 1993, c. 46 to be an unjustifiable
restriction of Section 2(b) rights. Although the decision in Sharpe was ove1iumed on appeal,
the majority acknowledged the privacy aspects of expression and limited the application of the
Criminal Code to protect truly private expression.

ONLINE LIBERTY ... 139

the regulation of hatred online would likely be a justifiable restriction of
freedom of expression rights in the Canadian context. Although the form
of online communication could alter the analysis, like telephone communications, the requirement of repeated communication would be
significant in considering the public or private nature of the expression.
The Internet clearly raises interpretative challenges which may effect the constitutionality of existing laws and the definition of future
content-based restrictions, but viewed as a whole, the problems raised
by new media do not justify a more stringent standard of review for
online communications.

VI. CONCLUSIONS
Canada aspires to be an inclusive and egalitarian society predicated
upon:
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, commitment to
social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and
political institutions which enhance the participation of individuals
and groups in society. 105

In order to achieve this goal it is essential to place a high value on both
individual and group rights and to find an appropriate balance where
there are tensions between these interests. The right to freedom of
expression is essential to the proper exercise of democracy but it is not
absolute and Section 2 (b) rights are no more absolute in cyberspace than
they are in real space. 106 The Internet's ability to facilitate broad-based
participation in the marketplace of ideas is laudable but it does not
transfo1m the basic principles that may justify the limitation of individual rights in a free and democratic society.
In assessing the level of deference to accord to government action,
Canadian Courts generally consider the stakeholders, the allocation of
scarce resources, the freedom of expression rationales, and the presence
of competing Charter rights. Most significant to the debate regarding

105
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Oakes, supra note 29 atl36.
Sopinka, J., "Freedom of Speech and Privacy in the Infonnation Age", supra note 33.
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online hate mongering and obscenity is that the Court is willing to defer
to government intervention where a law aims to protect vulnerable
groups. Vulnerability is not eliminated by cyberspace and should continue to be central in the Court's Section 1 analysis. Broad participation,
interactivity, and anonymity afforded online may in some circumstances
require a law be declared unconstitutional but such a decision must be
based upon a full analysis of the issues at stake in the case rather than a
broad idealistic generalization of online communications.
In his classical liberal text, On Liberty, John Stuart Mill promoted an
absolutist approach to the individual freedom of expression rights. Mill
asserted that:
[i]f all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one person
were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in
silencing that one person than he, if he had the power would be
justified in silencing mankind. 107

But Mill's own harm principle recognizes that individual liberty
may be limited where an individual's actions causes harm to others. As
Irwin Cotler asserts in regard to hate propaganda:
[p ]rotecting visible, vulnerable minorities from being vilified and
victimized by the promotion of hate propaganda may be the basis of
freedom of expression and freedom to debate in both principle and
reality. We know that speech can hmt. We have learned that words can
maim. We have felt the pain. 108

Cyberspace does not alter the nature of expression, which causes harm.
It does not operate in isolation from society or magically eliminate the
inequalities and social cleavages experienced in real space. Accordingly, it does not require a higher level of constih1tional scrntiny in the
absence of other factual circumstances.

107 J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Considerations on Representative Government
(London: J.M. Dent, 1993) at 85.
108
I. Cotler, "Racist Incitement: Giving Free Speech a Bad Name" in D. Schneidennan ed.,
Freedom of Expression and the Charter (Toronto: Carswell, 1991) at 249.

